

# Lightweight Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation for 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers

---


Hao Cheng   Johann Großschädl   Peter B. Rønne   Peter Y. A. Ryan

University of Luxembourg

CARDIS 2020




# IoT on the Rise



| IoT                       | 2019        | 2025        | CAGR       |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| Wide-area IoT             | 1.6         | 5.5         | 23%        |
| Cellular IoT <sup>3</sup> | 1.5         | 5.2         | 23%        |
| Short-range IoT           | 9.1         | 19.1        | 13%        |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>10.7</b> | <b>24.6</b> | <b>15%</b> |

Source: Ericsson Mobility Report (June 2020)

# IoT on the Rise




Source: Ericsson Mobility Report (June 2020)


| IoT                       | 2019        | 2025        | CAGR       |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| Wide-area IoT             | 1.6         | 5.5         | 23%        |
| Cellular IoT <sup>3</sup> | 1.5         | 5.2         | 23%        |
| Short-range IoT           | 9.1         | 19.1        | 13%        |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>10.7</b> | <b>24.6</b> | <b>15%</b> |

IoT needs **lightweight** cryptographic schemes and protocols

# 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers



Atmel®






# 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers



Atmel®




## 8-bit AVR Architecture

- ⦿ RISC philosophy and modified Harvard memory model
- ⦿ 32 general-purpose working registers of 8-bit width

# 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers




Atmel®



## 8-bit AVR Architecture

- ⊙ RISC philosophy and modified Harvard memory model
- ⊙ 32 general-purpose working registers of 8-bit width
- ⊙ Bitwise logical and most arithmetic instructions take 1 clock cycle
- ⊙ Multiplication and RAM accessing instructions take 2 clock cycles

# Quantum Cryptanalyses



## Quantum Computing

exploits quantum-mechanical phenomena

### Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring

Peter W. Shor  
AT&T Bell Labs  
Room 2D-149  
600 Mountain Ave.  
Murray Hill, NJ 07974, USA

#### Abstract

*A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a cost in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. Several researchers, starting with David Deutsch, have developed models for quantum mechanical computers and have investigated their computational properties. This paper gives Las Vegas algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and factoring integers on a quantum computer that take a number of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. (We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.)*

#### 1 Introduction

Since the discovery of quantum mechanics, people have found the behavior of the laws of probability in quantum mechanics counterintuitive. Because of this behavior, quantum mechanical phenomena behave quite differently than the phenomena of classical physics that we are used to. Feynman seems to have been the first to ask what effect this has on computation [13, 14]. He gave arguments as

[1, 2]. Although he did not ask whether quantum mechanics conferred extra power to computation, he did show that a Turing machine could be simulated by the reversible unitary evolution of a quantum process, which is a necessary prerequisite for quantum computation. Deutsch [9, 10] was the first to give an explicit model of quantum computation. He defined both quantum Turing machines and quantum circuits and investigated some of their properties.

The next part of this paper discusses how quantum computation relates to classical complexity classes. We will thus first give a brief intuitive discussion of complexity classes for those readers who do not have this background. There are generally two resources which limit the ability of computers to solve large problems: time and space (i.e., memory). The field of analysis of algorithms considers the asymptotic demands that algorithms make for these resources as a function of the problem size. Theoretical computer scientists generally classify algorithms as efficient when the number of steps of the algorithms grows as a polynomial in the size of the input. The class of problems which can be solved by efficient algorithms is known as P. This classification has several nice properties. For one thing, it does a reasonable job of reflecting the performance of algorithms in practice (although an algorithm whose running time is the tenth power of the input size, say, is not truly efficient). For another, this classification is nice theoretically, as different reasonable machine models produce the same class P. We will see this behavior reappear in quantum computation, where different models for

## Shor's Algorithm

solves IFP and DLP in polynomial time

# NIST PQC Standardization

The screenshot shows the NIST Information Technology Laboratory Computer Security Resource Center website. The header includes the NIST logo and the text 'Information Technology Laboratory' and 'COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER'. Below the header, there are two green buttons: 'PROJECTS' and 'POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY'. The main heading is 'Post-Quantum Cryptography PQC' with social media icons for Facebook and Twitter. Below this is the section 'Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization' followed by a paragraph of text: 'The [Round 3 candidates](#) were announced July 22, 2020. [NISTIR 8309](#), Status Report on the Second Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process is now available. NIST has developed [Guidelines for Submitting Tweaks for Third Round Finalists and Candidates](#).

- ⦿ Solicit, evaluate and standardize one or more quantum-resistant PKC algorithms
- ⦿ Evaluate candidates' performance also on resource-constrained devices
- ⦿ Now is Round 3

# Lattice-Based KEMs in IoT

- ⦿ Benchmarking results collected in pqm4 <sup>1</sup> (ARM Cortex-M4)
  - faster than Curve25519
  - RAM footprint often between 5 kB ~ 30 kB (vs 500 bytes of Curve25519)

---

<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/mupq/pqm4>

# Lattice-Based KEMs in IoT

- ⦿ Benchmarking results collected in pqm4 <sup>1</sup> (ARM Cortex-M4)
  - faster than Curve25519
  - RAM footprint often between 5 kB ~ 30 kB (vs 500 bytes of Curve25519)
- ⦿ Deployment in AVR devices
  - AVR devices feature only a few kB of RAM (e.g. MICAz mote has only 4 kB RAM)
  - need low-memory implementations

---

<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/mupq/pqm4>

# A Fairy Tale

## ⦿ Designer


- Mike Hamburg

## ⦿ Ed448-Goldilocks [Ham15]

- RFC7748 and TLS 1.3
- “Golden-ratio” Solinas prime  $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$  (Goldilocks)

## ⦿ ThreeBears

- NIST PQC Round 2 candidate (KEM)
- Integer Module Learning With Errors (I-MLWE) [Gu17]
- BabyBear (II), MamaBear (IV), PapaBear (V)
- has both CCA and CPA instances



# This Work

- ⊙ Analyzes the performance of ThreeBears on AVR
- ⊙ Studies its flexibility to achieve different trade-offs between RAM footprint and execution time



# Our Implementation

- ⦿ First highly-optimized software implementations of BabyBear for AVR platform (constant-time)

# Our Implementation

- ⊙ First highly-optimized software implementations of BabyBear for AVR platform (constant-time)
  - **Memory-Efficient** ME-BBear (CCA) ME-BBear-Eph (CPA)  
based on low-memory implementation in NIST package  
**most memory-efficient software implementation of Round 2 candidate**

# Our Implementation

- ⊙ First highly-optimized software implementations of BabyBear for AVR platform (constant-time)
  - **Memory-Efficient** ME-BBear (CCA) ME-BBear-Eph (CPA)  
based on low-memory implementation in NIST package  
**most memory-efficient software implementation of Round 2 candidate**
  - **High-Speed** HS-BBear (CCA) HS-BBear-Eph (CPA)  
based on optimized implementation in NIST package

# Our Implementation

- ⊙ First highly-optimized software implementations of BabyBear for AVR platform (constant-time)
  - **Memory-Efficient** ME-BBear (CCA) ME-BBear-Eph (CPA)  
based on low-memory implementation in NIST package  
**most memory-efficient software implementation of Round 2 candidate**
  - **High-Speed** HS-BBear (CCA) HS-BBear-Eph (CPA)  
based on optimized implementation in NIST package
- ⊙ **Memory-optimized** and **speed-optimized**  
**Multiply-ACcumulate (MAC) operations**  $r = r + a * b$

# ThreeBears KEM

- ⊙ The underlying field
  - $\mathbb{Z}/N$
- ⊙ Prime (“golden-ratio” Solinas prime [Ham15])
  - $N = 2^{3120} - 2^{1560} - 1$
  - $N = \phi(x) = x^D - x^{D/2} - 1$
  - $N = \lambda^2 - \lambda - 1$

# ThreeBears KEM

- ⊙ The underlying field
  - $\mathbb{Z}/N$
- ⊙ Prime (“golden-ratio” Solinas prime [Ham15])
  - $N = 2^{3120} - 2^{1560} - 1$
  - $N = \phi(x) = x^D - x^{D/2} - 1$
  - $N = \lambda^2 - \lambda - 1$
- ⊙ Field operations
  - $(+, \cdot)$  are conventional integer addition and multiplication
  - addition (+)  $a + b := a + b \bmod N$
  - multiplication (\*)  $a * b := a \cdot b \cdot \lambda^{-1} \bmod N$

# ThreeBears KEM (CCA)

## Key Generation

$sk \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$r \leftarrow \text{hash}(sk)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{z} \leftarrow z_i = b_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{i,j} * a_j$

-----  
private key     $sk$

public key     $(r, \mathbf{z})$

Dimension  $d$  is 2 for BabyBear, 3 for MamaBear, 4 for PapaBear

# ThreeBears KEM (CCA)

## Key Generation

$sk \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$r \leftarrow \text{hash}(sk)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{z} \leftarrow z_i = b_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{i,j} * a_j$

-----  
private key     $sk$

public key     $(r, \mathbf{z})$

## Encapsulation

$g \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\hat{\mathbf{a}}, \hat{\mathbf{b}}, c \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(r, g)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{y} \leftarrow y_i = \hat{b}_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{j,i} * \hat{a}_j$

$x = c + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} z_j * \hat{a}_j$

$f \leftarrow (\text{FEC\_encode}(g), x)$

$ss \leftarrow \text{hash}(r, g)$

-----  
shared secret     $ss$

ciphertext         $(f, \mathbf{y})$

Dimension  $d$  is 2 for BabyBear, 3 for MamaBear, 4 for PapaBear



# ThreeBears KEM (CCA)

## Key Generation

$sk \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$r \leftarrow \text{hash}(sk)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{z} \leftarrow z_i = b_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{i,j} * a_j$

-----  
private key  $sk$

public key  $(r, \mathbf{z})$

## Encapsulation

$g \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\hat{\mathbf{a}}, \hat{\mathbf{b}}, c \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(r, g)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{y} \leftarrow y_i = \hat{b}_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{j,i} * \hat{a}_j$

$x = c + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} z_j * \hat{a}_j$

$f \leftarrow (\text{FEC\_encode}(g), x)$

$ss \leftarrow \text{hash}(r, g)$

-----  
shared secret  $ss$

ciphertext  $(f, \mathbf{y})$

## Decapsulation

$\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$x = \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} y_j * a_j$

$g \leftarrow \text{FEC\_decode}(f, x)$

$(r', \mathbf{z}') \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(sk)$

$ss', (f', \mathbf{y}') \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(g, (r', \mathbf{z}'))$

$(f', \mathbf{y}') \stackrel{?}{=} (f, \mathbf{y})$

-----  
shared secret

$ss' \leftarrow \checkmark$

$\text{hash}(sk, f, \mathbf{y}) \leftarrow \times$

Dimension  $d$  is 2 for BabyBear, 3 for MamaBear, 4 for PapaBear

# ThreeBears KEM (CPA)

## Key Generation

$sk \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$r \leftarrow \text{hash}(sk)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{z} \leftarrow z_i = b_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{i,j} * a_j$

-----  
private key  $sk$   
public key  $(r, \mathbf{z})$

## Encapsulation

$g \leftarrow \text{random}()$

$\hat{\mathbf{a}}, \hat{\mathbf{b}}, c \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(r, g)$

$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \text{uniform\_sampler}(r)$

$\mathbf{y} \leftarrow y_i = \hat{b}_i + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} M_{j,i} * \hat{a}_j$

$x = c + \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} z_j * \hat{a}_j$

$t \leftarrow \text{hash}(r, g)$

$f \leftarrow (\text{FEC\_encode}(t), x)$

$ss \leftarrow \text{hash}(r, t)$

-----  
shared secret  $ss$   
ciphertext  $(f, \mathbf{y})$

## Decapsulation

$\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \text{noise\_sampler}(sk)$

$x = \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} y_j * a_j$

$t \leftarrow \text{FEC\_decode}(f, x)$

$r \leftarrow \text{hash}(sk)$

$ss \leftarrow \text{hash}(r, t)$

-----  
shared secret  $ss$

Dimension  $d$  is 2 for BabyBear, 3 for MamaBear, 4 for PapaBear

# Implementation View Point

- ⊙ Auxiliary functions
  - samplers: noise/uniform sampler → cSHAKE256 → Keccak permutation
  - forward error correction (FEC): Melas BCH code
- ⊙ Arithmetic components
  - MAC operation:  $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

---

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/tree/master/lib/low/KeccakP-1600/AVR8>

# Implementation View Point

## ⊙ Auxiliary functions

- samplers: noise/uniform sampler → cSHAKE256 → Keccak permutation  
open-source highly-optimized AVR Assembler<sup>2</sup>
- forward error correction (FEC): Melas BCH code

## ⊙ Arithmetic components

- MAC operation:  $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

---

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/tree/master/lib/low/KeccakP-1600/AVR8>

# Implementation View Point

- ⊙ Auxiliary functions
  - samplers: noise/uniform sampler → cSHAKE256 → Keccak permutation  
open-source highly-optimized AVR Assembler<sup>2</sup>
  - forward error correction (FEC): Melas BCH code  
small memory/code requirements, constant time and runtime is almost negligible
- ⊙ Arithmetic components
  - MAC operation:  $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

---

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/tree/master/lib/low/KeccakP-1600/AVR8>

# Implementation View Point

## ⊙ Auxiliary functions

- samplers: noise/uniform sampler → cSHAKE256 → Keccak permutation  
open-source highly-optimized AVR Assembler<sup>2</sup>
- forward error correction (FEC): Melas BCH code  
small memory/code requirements, constant time and runtime is almost negligible

## ⊙ Arithmetic components

- MAC operation:  $r = r + a * b \bmod N$   
dominate both the RAM footprint and the execution time !!

---

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/tree/master/lib/low/KeccakP-1600/AVR8>

## Field Element Representation

$$N = 2^{3120} - 2^{1560} - 1 \rightarrow 3120\text{-bit integer}$$

# Field Element Representation

$$N = 2^{3120} - 2^{1560} - 1 \rightarrow 3120\text{-bit integer}$$

## Reduced-radix representation ( $w = 32$ )

- ⦿ Format       $120 \times 26 \text{ bits} = 3120 \text{ bits}$
- ⦿ RAM usage    $120 \times 4 \text{ bytes} = 480 \text{ bytes}$



# Field Element Representation

$$N = 2^{3120} - 2^{1560} - 1 \rightarrow 3120\text{-bit integer}$$

## Reduced-radix representation ( $w = 32$ )

- ⊙ Format       $120 \times 26 \text{ bits} = 3120 \text{ bits}$
- ⊙ RAM usage    $120 \times 4 \text{ bytes} = 480 \text{ bytes}$

## Full-radix representation ( $w = 32$ )

- ⊙ Format       $97.5 \times 32 \text{ bits} = 3120 \text{ bits}$
- ⊙ RAM usage    $98 \times 4 \text{ bytes} = 392 \text{ bytes}$
- ⊙ Why?
  - Sequential order in AVR
  - Reduce RAM consumption

MAC Operation  $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

$$N = \lambda^2 - \lambda - 1 \rightarrow \lambda^{-1} = \lambda - 1$$

## MAC Operation $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

$$N = \lambda^2 - \lambda - 1 \quad \rightarrow \quad \lambda^{-1} = \lambda - 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} z := a * b &= a \cdot b \cdot \lambda^{-1} = (a_L + a_H \lambda)(b_L + b_H \lambda) \cdot \lambda^{-1} \bmod N \\ &= a_L b_L \lambda^{-1} + (a_L b_H + a_H b_L) + a_H b_H \lambda \bmod N \\ &= a_L b_L (\lambda - 1) + (a_L b_H + a_H b_L) + a_H b_H \lambda \bmod N \\ &= (a_L b_H + a_H b_L - a_L b_L) + (a_L b_L + a_H b_H) \lambda \bmod N \end{aligned}$$

$e_L/e_H$  stands for the lower/higher half of element  $e$

## MAC Operation $r = r + a * b \bmod N$

$$N = \lambda^2 - \lambda - 1 \quad \rightarrow \quad \lambda^{-1} = \lambda - 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} z := a * b &= a \cdot b \cdot \lambda^{-1} = (a_L + a_H \lambda)(b_L + b_H \lambda) \cdot \lambda^{-1} \bmod N \\ &= a_L b_L \lambda^{-1} + (a_L b_H + a_H b_L) + a_H b_H \lambda \bmod N \\ &= a_L b_L (\lambda - 1) + (a_L b_H + a_H b_L) + a_H b_H \lambda \bmod N \\ &= (a_L b_H + a_H b_L - a_L b_L) + (a_L b_L + a_H b_H) \lambda \bmod N \\ &= (a_H b_H - (a_L - a_H)(b_L - b_H)) + (a_L b_L + a_H b_H) \lambda \bmod N \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$e_L/e_H$  stands for the lower/higher half of element  $e$

## MAC Operation $r = r + a * b \text{ mod } N$

$$r := r + a * b \text{ mod } N$$

$$= (r_L + a_H b_H - (a_L - a_H)(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + a_L b_L + a_H b_H)\lambda \text{ mod } N \quad (2)$$

$$= (r_L + a_H b_L - a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H + a_L(b_L - b_H))\lambda \text{ mod } N \quad (3)$$

$$= (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \text{ mod } N \quad (4)$$

# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

**Algorithm 1** Memory-optimized MAC operation

---

**Input:** Aligned  $s$ -word integers  $A = (A_{s-1}, \dots, A_1, A_0)$ ,  $B = (B_{s-1}, \dots, B_1, B_0)$ , and  $R = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ , each word contains  $\omega$  bits;  $\beta$  is a parameter of alignment

**Output:** Aligned  $s$ -word product  $R = R + A \cdot B \cdot \lambda \pmod N = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$

```
1:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 0, Z_1 \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $l \leftarrow s/2$ 
3: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
4:    $Z_2 \leftarrow 0, k \leftarrow i+1$ 
5:   for  $j$  from 0 to  $i$  by 1 do
6:      $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
7:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
8:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
9:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
10:  end for
11:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 - 2 \cdot Z_2$ 
12:   $k \leftarrow l$ 
13:  for  $j$  from  $i+1$  to  $l-1$  by 1 do
14:     $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
15:     $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
16:     $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
17:     $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
18:  end for
19:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_2 + R_i$ 
20:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + Z_2 + R_{i+l}$ 
21:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
22:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
23:   $R_{i+l} \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
24:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
25: end for
26:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
27:  $Z_1 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_1 + R_{s-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
28:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
29:  $R_{s-1} \leftarrow R_{s-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
30:  $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_1$ 
31: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
32:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + R_i$ 
33:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
34:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
35: end for
36:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
37:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
38: for  $i$  from  $l$  to  $s-1$  by 1 do
39:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + R_i$ 
40:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
41:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
42: end for
43: return  $(R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ 
```

---

## RAM consumption

- ⊙ Three 80-bit accumulators
- ⊙ some local variables
- ⊙ no more levels of Karatsuba (reduce RAM usage)

# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

**Algorithm 1** Memory-optimized MAC operation

---

**Input:** Aligned  $s$ -word integers  $A = (A_{s-1}, \dots, A_1, A_0)$ ,  $B = (B_{s-1}, \dots, B_1, B_0)$ , and  $R = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ , each word contains  $\omega$  bits;  $\beta$  is a parameter of alignment

**Output:** Aligned  $s$ -word product  $R = R + A \cdot B \cdot \lambda \pmod N = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$

```
1:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 0, Z_1 \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $l \leftarrow s/2$ 
3: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
4:    $Z_2 \leftarrow 0, k \leftarrow i+1$ 
5:   for  $j$  from 0 to  $i$  by 1 do
6:      $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
7:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
8:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
9:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
10:  end for
11:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 - 2 \cdot Z_2$ 
12:   $k \leftarrow l$ 
13:  for  $j$  from  $i+1$  to  $l-1$  by 1 do
14:     $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
15:     $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
16:     $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
17:     $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
18:  end for
19:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_2 + R_i$ 
20:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + Z_2 + R_{i+l}$ 
21:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
22:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
23:   $R_{i+l} \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
24:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
25: end for
26:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
27:  $Z_1 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_1 + R_{s-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
28:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
29:  $R_{s-1} \leftarrow R_{s-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
30:  $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_1$ 
31: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
32:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + R_i$ 
33:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
34:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
35: end for
36:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
37:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
38: for  $i$  from  $l$  to  $s-1$  by 1 do
39:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + R_i$ 
40:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
41:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
42: end for
43: return  $(R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ 
```

---

## Main MAC loop

- ⊙ Product-scanning
- ⊙ Interleaved with modular reductions  $\lambda^2 = \lambda + 1$  (lines from 19 to 24)

# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \bmod N$$

---

**Algorithm 1** Memory-optimized MAC operation

---

**Input:** Aligned  $s$ -word integers  $A = (A_{s-1}, \dots, A_1, A_0)$ ,  $B = (B_{s-1}, \dots, B_1, B_0)$ , and  $R = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ , each word contains  $\omega$  bits;  $\beta$  is a parameter of alignment

**Output:** Aligned  $s$ -word product  $R = R + A \cdot B \cdot \lambda \bmod N = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$

```
1:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 0, Z_1 \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $l \leftarrow s/2$ 
3: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
4:    $Z_2 \leftarrow 0, k \leftarrow i+1$ 
5:   for  $j$  from 0 to  $i$  by 1 do
6:      $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
7:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
8:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
9:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
10:  end for
11:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 - 2 \cdot Z_2$ 
12:   $k \leftarrow l$ 
13:  for  $j$  from  $i+1$  to  $l-1$  by 1 do
14:     $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
15:     $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
16:     $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
17:     $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
18:  end for
19:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_2 + R_i$ 
20:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + Z_2 + R_{i+l}$ 
21:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \bmod 2^\omega$ 
22:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
23:   $R_{i+l} \leftarrow Z_1 \bmod 2^\omega$ 
24:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
25: end for
26:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
27:  $Z_1 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_1 + R_{s-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
28:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \bmod 2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
29:  $R_{s-1} \leftarrow R_{s-1} \bmod 2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
30:  $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_1$ 
31: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
32:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + R_i$ 
33:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_1 \bmod 2^\omega$ 
34:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
35: end for
36:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
37:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \bmod 2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
38: for  $i$  from  $l$  to  $s-1$  by 1 do
39:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + R_i$ 
40:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \bmod 2^\omega$ 
41:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
42: end for
43: return  $(R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ 
```

---

Final reduction modulo  $N$   
Carry propagation



# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

## Algorithm 1 Memory-optimized MAC operation

---

**Input:** Aligned  $s$ -word integers  $A = (A_{s-1}, \dots, A_1, A_0)$ ,  $B = (B_{s-1}, \dots, B_1, B_0)$ , and  $R = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ , each word contains  $\omega$  bits;  $\beta$  is a parameter of alignment

**Output:** Aligned  $s$ -word product  $R = R + A \cdot B \cdot \lambda \pmod N = (R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$

```

1:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 0, Z_1 \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $l \leftarrow s/2$ 
3: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
4:    $Z_2 \leftarrow 0, k \leftarrow i+1$ 
5:   for  $j$  from 0 to  $i$  by 1 do
6:      $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
7:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
8:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
9:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
10:  end for
11:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 - 2 \cdot Z_2$ 
12:   $k \leftarrow l$ 
13:  for  $j$  from  $i+1$  to  $l-1$  by 1 do
14:     $k \leftarrow k-1$ 
15:     $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+1} \cdot B_k$ 
16:     $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+1}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
17:     $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
18:  end for
19:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_2 + R_i$ 
20:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + Z_2 + R_{i+l}$ 
21:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
22:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
23:   $R_{i+l} \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
24:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
25: end for
26:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
27:  $Z_1 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_1 + R_{s-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
28:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
29:  $R_{s-1} \leftarrow R_{s-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
30:  $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + Z_1$ 
31: for  $i$  from 0 to  $l-1$  by 1 do
32:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + R_i$ 
33:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_1 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
34:   $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1/2^\omega$ 
35: end for
36:  $Z_0 \leftarrow 2^\beta \cdot Z_0 + R_{l-1}/2^{\omega-\beta}$ 
37:  $R_{l-1} \leftarrow R_{l-1} \pmod{2^{\omega-\beta}}$ 
38: for  $i$  from  $l$  to  $s-1$  by 1 do
39:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + R_i$ 
40:   $R_i \leftarrow Z_0 \pmod{2^\omega}$ 
41:   $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0/2^\omega$ 
42: end for
43: return  $(R_{s-1}, \dots, R_1, R_0)$ 

```

---

Inner loop operations  
Triple MAC

# Memory-Optimized MAC


$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

## Algorithm 2 First triple MAC loop

---

- 1:  $Z_2 \leftarrow 0, k \leftarrow i + 1$
  - 2: **for**  $j$  from 0 to  $i$  by 1 **do**
  - 3:      $k \leftarrow k - 1$
  - 4:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + A_{j+l} \cdot B_k$
  - 5:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + (A_j + A_{j+l}) \cdot B_{k+l}$
  - 6:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$
  - 7: **end for**
  - 8:  $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 - 2 \cdot Z_2$
- 



# Memory-Optimized MAC


$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

## Algorithm 3 Second triple MAC loop

---

- 1:  $k \leftarrow l$
  - 2: **for**  $j$  from  $i + 1$  to  $l - 1$  by 1 **do**
  - 3:      $k \leftarrow k - 1$
  - 4:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+l} \cdot B_k$
  - 5:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+l}) \cdot B_{k+l}$
  - 6:      $Z_3 \leftarrow Z_3 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$
  - 7: **end for**
  - 8:  $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 - 2 \cdot Z_3$
- 



# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---

## Algorithm 3 Second triple MAC loop

---

```
1:  $k \leftarrow l$ 
2: for  $j$  from  $i + 1$  to  $l - 1$  by 1 do
3:    $k \leftarrow k - 1$ 
4:    $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+l} \cdot B_k$ 
5:    $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+l}) \cdot B_{k+l}$ 
6:    $Z_3 \leftarrow Z_3 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$ 
7: end for
8:  $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 - 2 \cdot Z_3$ 
```

---

$$\lambda^3 = (\lambda + 1) \cdot \lambda = \lambda^2 + \lambda = (\lambda + 1) + \lambda = 2\lambda + 1 \pmod N$$

$$\begin{aligned} Z_0 &\leftarrow Z_0 + Z_3 \\ Z_1 &\leftarrow Z_1 - 2 \cdot Z_3 + 2 \cdot Z_3 = Z_1 \end{aligned}$$

# Memory-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + a_H b_L - 2a_L(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + (a_L + a_H)b_H)\lambda + a_L(b_L - b_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N$$

---


## Algorithm 3 Second triple MAC loop

---

- 1:  $k \leftarrow l$
  - 2: **for**  $j$  from  $i + 1$  to  $l - 1$  by 1 **do**
  - 3:      $k \leftarrow k - 1$
  - 4:      $Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + 2^\beta \cdot A_{j+l} \cdot B_k$
  - 5:      $Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + 2^\beta \cdot (A_j + A_{j+l}) \cdot B_{k+l}$
  - 6:      $Z_0 \leftarrow Z_0 + 2^\beta \cdot A_j \cdot (B_k - B_{k+l})$
  - 7: **end for**
- 

$$\lambda^3 = \lambda^2 \cdot \lambda = (\lambda + 1) \cdot \lambda = \lambda^2 + \lambda = (\lambda + 1) + \lambda = 2\lambda + 1 \pmod N$$


$$\begin{aligned} Z_0 &\leftarrow Z_0 + Z_3 \\ Z_1 &\leftarrow Z_1 - 2 \cdot Z_3 + 2 \cdot Z_3 = Z_1 \end{aligned}$$



# (4 × 4)-byte Multiplication

## Reverse Product Scanning (RPS) multiplication [LSGK14]

- Enhanced variant of conventional hybrid multiplication [GPW+04]
- Fast, small-code-size, fewer-registers and parameterized



Inner-loop operations of RPS multiplication (middle)

# Speed-Optimized MAC

$$\begin{aligned}r &:= (r_L + a_H b_H - (a_L - a_H)(b_L - b_H)) + (r_H + a_L b_L + a_H b_H)\lambda \pmod N \\ &= (r_L + h + m) + (r_H + l + h)\lambda \pmod N \\ &= (r_L + (h_L + h_H\lambda) + (m_L + m_H\lambda)) + (r_H + (l_L + l_H\lambda) + (h_L + h_H\lambda))\lambda \pmod N \\ &= (r_L + h_L + m_L) + (r_H + l_L + h_L + m_H + h_H)\lambda + (l_H + h_H)\lambda^2 \pmod N \\ &= (r_L + m_L + \underline{h_L + h_H + l_H}) + (r_H + m_H + h_H + l_L + \underline{h_L + h_H + l_H})\lambda \pmod N \quad (5)\end{aligned}$$

$$l \quad a_L b_L$$

$$m \quad -(a_L - a_H)(b_L - b_H)$$

$$h \quad a_H b_H$$

# Speed-Optimized MAC

$$r := (r_L + m_L + \underline{h_L + h_H + l_H}) + (r_H + m_H + h_H + l_L + \underline{h_L + h_H + l_H})\lambda \pmod N$$

## Experiments for speed-optimized MAC

### ⊙ Combination

- Subtractive Karatsuba method [HS14]  $\Theta(n^{\log_2 3})$
- RPS multiplication [LSGK14]  $\Theta(n^2)$

### ⊙ Result

- 3-level Karatsuba with  $(390 \times 390)$ -bit RPS multiplication underneath for the entire MAC



# MAC Optimization Strategies

- ⊙ Memory-optimized MAC operation
  - Equation (4)
  - one-level Karatsuba multiplication (product-scanning)
  - RPS technique for inner-loop operation
  
- ⊙ Speed-optimized MAC operation
  - Equation (5)
  - three-level Karatsuba multiplication
  - RPS multiplication

# Measurement Environment

## Experiment Setup

- ⦿ Target MCU: ATmega1284 (16 kB RAM; 128 kB flash memory)
- ⦿ Development tool: Atmel Studio v7.0
- ⦿ Compiler: avr-gcc 5.4.0

## Our source code

- ⦿ AVR Assembler: MAC operation; Keccak permutation
- ⦿ C code: other components

# Performance Evaluation

Execution time (in clock cycles) of our implementations on AVR

| Implementation | Security   | MAC       | KeyGen    | Encaps     | Decaps     |
|----------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| ME-BBear       | CCA-secure | 1,033,728 | 8,746,418 | 12,289,744 | 18,578,335 |
| ME-BBear-Eph   | CPA-secure | 1,033,728 | 8,746,418 | 12,435,165 | 3,444,154  |
| HS-BBear       | CCA-secure | 604,703   | 6,123,527 | 7,901,873  | 12,476,447 |
| HS-BBear-Eph   | CPA-secure | 604,703   | 6,123,527 | 8,047,835  | 2,586,202  |

HS version is 1.5x faster compared to ME

# Performance Evaluation

RAM usage and code size (both in bytes) of our implementations on AVR

| Implementation  | MAC        |       | KeyGen |       | Encaps |       | Decaps |        | Total        |        |
|-----------------|------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------------|--------|
|                 | RAM        | Size  | RAM    | Size  | RAM    | Size  | RAM    | Size   | RAM          | Size   |
| ME-BBearing     | 82         | 2,760 | 1,715  | 6,432 | 1,735  | 7,554 | 2,368  | 10,110 | 2,368        | 12,264 |
| ME-BBearing-Eph | <b>82</b>  | 2,760 | 1,715  | 6,432 | 1,735  | 7,640 | 1,731  | 8,270  | <b>1,735</b> | 10,998 |
| HS-BBearing     | 934        | 3,332 | 2,733  | 7,000 | 2,752  | 8,140 | 4,559  | 10,684 | 4,559        | 11,568 |
| HS-BBearing-Eph | <b>934</b> | 3,332 | 2,733  | 7,000 | 2,752  | 8,226 | 2,356  | 8,846  | <b>2,752</b> | 10,296 |

ME version is **1.5x** RAM-efficient compared to HS

# Comparison – AVR Implementations

Comparison with other key-establishment algorithms (all of which target 128-bit security)  
on 8-bit AVR (Encaps and Decaps in clock cycles; RAM and code size in bytes)

| Implementation     | Algorithm  | Encaps            | Decaps            | RAM          | Size   |
|--------------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|
| This work (ME-CCA) | ThreeBears | 12,289,744        | 18,578,335        | 2,368        | 12,264 |
| This work (ME-CPA) | ThreeBears | <b>12,435,165</b> | <b>3,444,154</b>  | <b>1,735</b> | 10,998 |
| This work (HS-CCA) | ThreeBears | 7,901,873         | 12,476,447        | 4,559        | 11,568 |
| This work (HS-CPA) | ThreeBears | 8,047,835         | 2,586,202         | 2,752        | 10,296 |
| [CDG+19]           | NTRU Prime | 8,160,665         | 15,602,748        | n/a          | 11,478 |
| [DHH+15] (ME)      | Curve25519 | 14,146,844        | 14,146,844        | 510          | 9,912  |
| [DHH+15] (HS)      | Curve25519 | <b>13,900,397</b> | <b>13,900,397</b> | <b>494</b>   | 17,710 |

Encaps **1.12x** faster; Decaps **4.0x** faster; RAM **3.5x** more; compared to Curve25519

# Comparison – RAM Footprint

Comparison of RAM consumption (in bytes) of NIST PQC implementations (all of which target NIST security category 1 or 2) on AVR and Cortex-M4 microcontrollers

| Implementation     | Algorithm  | Platform  | KeyGen        | Encaps       | Decaps        |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| CCA-secure schemes |            |           |               |              |               |
| This work (ME)     | ThreeBears | AVR       | 1,715         | 1,735        | <b>2,368</b>  |
| [Ham19]            | ThreeBears | Cortex-M4 | 2,288         | 2,352        | <b>3,024</b>  |
| pqm4               | ThreeBears | Cortex-M4 | 3,076         | 2,964        | <b>5,092</b>  |
| pqm4               | Kyber      | Cortex-M4 | 2,388         | 2,476        | <b>2,492</b>  |
| pqm4               | NTRU       | Cortex-M4 | <b>11,848</b> | 6,864        | 5,144         |
| pqm4               | Saber      | Cortex-M4 | 9,652         | 11,388       | <b>12,132</b> |
| CPA-secure schemes |            |           |               |              |               |
| This work (ME)     | ThreeBears | AVR       | 1,715         | <b>1,735</b> | 1,731         |
| [Ham19]            | ThreeBears | Cortex-M4 | 2,288         | <b>2,352</b> | 2,080         |
| pqm4               | ThreeBears | Cortex-M4 | <b>3,076</b>  | 2,980        | 2,420         |
| pqm4               | NewHope    | Cortex-M4 | 3,836         | <b>4,940</b> | 3,200         |
| pqm4               | Round5     | Cortex-M4 | 4,052         | <b>4,500</b> | 2,308         |

The most RAM-efficient software implementation of Round 2 candidates

# Conclusion

- ⊙ The first highly-optimized Assembler implementation of ThreeBears for AVR
- ⊙ Many trade-offs between execution time and RAM consumption are possible
- ⊙ A new record for memory efficiency among second-round candidates
- ⊙ Very well suited for a hybrid pre/post-quantum key agreement protocol
- ⊙ An excellent candidate for a post-quantum cryptosystem to secure the IoT

Thank you for your attention!